

## Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 LONDON 07815 01 OF 09 111806Z  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 09 LONDON 07815

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/RPM ONLY

MADRID FOR HARTMAN AND HOLMES ONLY

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1  
TAGS: NATO, PFOR  
SUBJECT: MAY 11 NAC MINISTERIAL MEETING

FOLLOWING IS UNCLEARED ACCOUNT OF MAY 11 NATO MINISTERIAL  
MEETING. DEPARTMENT PLEASE CLEAR AND DISTRIBUTE AS  
APPROPRIATE.

1. THE SECRETARY GENERAL OPENED THE COUNCIL WITH AGENDA  
ITEM II, "CSCE: PREPARATION FOR BELGRADE AND REVIEW OF  
IMPLEMENTATION." THE DISCUSSION WAS BASED ON NATO  
DOCUMENTS CM(77)29(FINAL) AND C-M(77)30(FINAL).

2. THE TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THE DOCUMENTS WERE  
IN LINE WITH WHAT WOULD BE OPPORTUNE FOR HIS GOVERNMENT  
REPRESENTATIVES TO FOLLOW. CAGLAYANGIL FORESAW, HOWEVER,  
PROBLEMS WITH IMPLEMENTATION AND POINTED OUT THAT ONE  
SHOULD REMEMBER CONDITIONS CREATED BY EVENTS IN THE PAST  
FEW YEARS. FOR EXAMPLE, BASKET III HAD AN INDEPENDENT  
EXISTENCE AND PROVIDED THE IMPETUS FOR CONSTANT PRESSURE  
FOR WIDER IMPLEMENTATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS. DEMOCRACIES  
SHOULD NOT TRY TO FORCE THE HAND OF THE EASTERN GOVERN-  
MENTS BUT SHOULD RATHER CONTINUE THE DIALOGUE THROUGH  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 LONDON 07815 01 OF 09 111806Z

DISCUSSION. NO PROGRESS WOULD BE POSSIBLE IF THE EAST  
FELT THREATENED BY HOSTILE ATTITUDES. THE BELGRADE  
MEETING SHOULD NOT BECOME A SERIES OF STERILE OR BITTER  
DISCUSSIONS. CAQLAYANGIL SAID THE FINAL ACT WAS NOT A  
LEGAL DOCUMENT WHICH DEFINED CONDITIONS FOR THE APPLI-  
CATION OF POLICIES IN EUROOE. ON THE QUESTION OF  
FOLLOW-UP, HE OPINED THAT MEETINGS SUCH AS BELGRADE COULD

BE ORGANIZED FREQUENTLY BUT NOT NECESSARILY REGULARLY. BELGRADE SHOULD BE A SPRINGBOARD TO THE FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF IDEAS THROUGHOUT EUROPE. HE NOTED THAT THE BELGRADE DISCUSSIONS COULD BE LONG AND BITTER AND SUGGESTED THAT THE DELEGATIONS SHOULD AGREE BEFOREHAND ON THE LENGTH OF THE DISCUSSIONS.

3. THE ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THE WEST SHOULD GUARANTEE THROUGH THESE DIALOGUES SECURITY IN EUROPE BY GIVING POSITIVE IMPLEMENTATION TO DETENTE. FORLANI HOPED THAT ALL THE EASTERN PROPOSALS WOULD NOT BE PROPAGANDA "SPECTACULARS," AS WAS OFTEN THE CASE IN GENEVA. HE SAID THAT BELGRADE SHOULD TRY TO SATISFY PUBLIC EXPECTATIONS BUT EMPHASIZED THAT BELGRADE WAS NOT MEANT TO RENEGOTIATE ANYTHING THAT WAS AGREED IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT.

4. THE DANISH FOREIGN MINISTER, ADDRESSING HIMSELF TO THE DURATION OF THE BELGRADE MEETING, AGREED THAT THE MEETING SHOULD NOT BE LONG BUT SAID IT COULD BE USEFUL TO ESTABLISH A TARGET CLOSING DATE EXTENDABLE BY CONSENSUS. WHILE NOTING THAT AN OPEN-ENDED MEETING COULD DRAG ON INDEFINITELY, ANDERSEN DISAGREED WITH THE WARSAW PACT ARGUMENT FOR A SHORT MEETING AND SUGGESTED THAT PERHAPS TWO OR THREE MONTHS WOULD BE AN APPROPRIATE DURATION. HE THEN POINTED OUT THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING CONTACTS AND DISCUSSIONS ON BELGRADE WITH THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED NATIONS. THE WEST WAS IN DANGER OF NEGLECTING THE SOCIAL ASPECT OF THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 LONDON 07815 01 OF 09 111806Z

RIGHTS AND ARGUED THAT THE WEST MIGHT LOSE AN IDEOLOGICAL BATTLE IN THE THIRD WORLD TO THE USSR IF ITS VIEW OF HUMAN RIGHTS WERE TOO NARROW. HE POINTED OUT THAT HUMAN RIGHTS WERE NOT ONLY "INTELLECTUAL EXERCISES" IN POLITICAL FREEDOM BUT ALSO INCLUDED SECURITY, SOCIAL SECURITY, EMPLOYMENT, FOOD, ETC. HE NOTED THAT PRESIDENT CARTER HAD SAID DURING THE MAY 10 SESSION THAT WE SHOULD SEEK COOPERATION AND NOT CONFRONTATION AT BELGRADE. AGREEING WITH THE PRESIDENT, ANDERSEN SAID THERE WOULD BE MORE MEETINGS IN THE FUTURE AND THAT CONFRONTATION WOULD NOT AUGUR WELL FOR SUCH MEETINGS.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 LONDON 07815 02 OF 09 111812Z  
ACTION EUR-12

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 09 LONDON 07815

5. THE NETHERLANDS FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THAT WHILE HE WAS UNHAPPY WITH THE INCOMPLETE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINAL ACT, THE ACT ITSELF REMAINED OF GREAT IMPORTANCE AND SHOULD CONSTITUTE THE BASIS OF DIALOGUE WITH THE EAST. VAN DER STOEL SAID THAT SPECIALIZED MEETINGS, SUCH AS THOSE REFERRED TO IN THE BREZHNEV PROPOSALS, SHOULD BE REGARDED AS INCIDENTAL AND SHOULD BE SET INTO THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ECE. WE SHOULD SEEK COOPERATION IN BELGRADE BUT THIS COOPERATION DID NOT DEPEND FULLY ON THE WEST. HE CONCURRED IN NOT SEEKING CONFRONTATION BUT ARGUED THAT THE WEST SHOULD NOT PAPER IT OVER IF IT EXISTED.

6. HE SAID THAT THE USSR IS ATTEMPTING TO HIDE POLITICAL DIFFERENCES BY SEEKING A "POLITICAL CONCEPT" FOR BELGRADE. ITS AIM IS TO DEPRIVE THE MEETING OF ITS CREDIBILITY. THE WEST MUST TELL THE USSR THAT WE CANNOT DISCUSS POLITICAL CONCEPTS AT THE PREPARATORY MEETING, WE CAN ONLY DISCUSS THE FINAL ACT. ON THE QUESTION OF DURATION, VAN DER STOEL SAID WE SHOULD NOT TIE OURSELVES DOWN WITH A DEADLINE. IF THE USSR WANTS A SHORT MEETING, WE SHOULD USE THE LEVERAGE PROVIDED BY THAT DESIRE BY THE USSR. ABOVE ALL, WE SHOULD AVOID ANY SEMBLANCE OF JOINT EAST-WEST PRESSURE ON THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 LONDON 07815 02 OF 09 111812Z

COUNTRIES TO HURRY AT BELGRADE. HE SUGGESTED THAT NEW PROPOSALS COULD BE PRESENTED IN THE FORM OF EXPLANATORY NOTES, PERHAPS CLOSING WITH A FEW DRAFT SENTENCES ON THEIR FUTURE IMPLEMENTATION. A PARTICULAR OPPORTUNITY IN THE AREA OF NEW PROPOSALS EXISTED IN THE FIELD OF

CBMS. A PROPOSAL ON NOTIFICATION OF MOVEMENTS WOULD BE ESPECIALLY WELCOME. IN CLOSING VAN DER STOEL NOTED THAT HUMAN RIGHTS WERE VERY IMPORTANT AND THE WEST COULD NOT BE ACCUSED OF INTERVENTION IF IT DISCUSSED HUMAN RIGHTS IN ANY OF THE SIGNATORY COUNTRIES. HE SAID THAT OUR POSITION ON HUMAN RIGHTS SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED AS LATE AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT CURRENT EVENTS.

7. THE NORWEGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THE DOCUMENTS UNDER DISCUSSION WERE A GOOD PLATFORM AND SHOULD GIVE NATO THE POSSIBILITY OF TAKING AND KEEPING THE INITIATIVE, AS IT DID AT GENEVA. FRYDENLUND NOTED THE SOVIETS WOULD TRY TO POINT OUT WEAKNESSES IN WESTERN SOCIETIES AND WESTERN NON-OBSERVANCE OF THE FINAL ACT. HE AGREED WITH THE DESIRABILITY OF MAINTAINING CLOSE CONTACT WITH THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED NATIONS. WHILE THE WEST, OF COURSE, COULD NOT INSIST ON AN IMMEDIATE AND FULL APPLICATION OF WESTERN POLITICAL FREEDOMS IN THE EAST, THE WEST SHOULD UNDERLINE ITS COMMITMENTS TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN ITS INTERVENTIONS AT BELGRADE. CBMS ARE VERY USEFUL AND SIGNIFICANT. HE WAS GLAD THAT THE FOLLOW-UP ON THE NORWEGIAN "POLLUTANTS" PROPOSALS HAD FOUND WIDE ACCEPTANCE AND HOPED THAT BELGRADE WOULD ENDORSE THESE PROPOSALS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ECE. FRYDENLAND SUGGESTED THE NATO DOCUMENTS UNDER DISCUSSION MIGHT HAVE TAKEN TOO CRITICAL A VIEW OF THE BREZHNEV PROPOSALS AND SUGGESTED THAT OUR ATTITUDE BE MORE POSITIVE WHILE MAINTAINING OUR POSITION THAT THE BREZHNEV PROPOSALS BE REFERRED TO THE ECE. HE CLOSED BY SUGGESTING THAT ANOTHER FOLLOW-UP MEETING BE CONSIDERED IN PERHAPS TWO YEARS.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 LONDON 07815 02 OF 09 111812Z

8. THE PORTUGUESE FOREIGN MINISTER POINTED OUT THAT THE WEST WOULD NOT CONSTITUTE A BLOC AT BELGRADE BECAUSE IT CONSISTED OF DIVERSE COUNTRIES WHICH WERE

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 LONDON 07815 03 OF 09 111828Z  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 09 LONDON 07815

HOWEVER UNITED BY COMMON IDEALS. FERREIRA SAID THAT DEMOCRATIC PORTUGAL, WHICH HE WAS PROUD TO REPRESENT, FAVORED HUMAN RIGHTS BUT AGREED WITH THE DANISH VIEW THAT HUMAN RIGHTS BE EXPANDED TO INCLUDE SOCIAL RIGHTS. HE CONGRATULATED THE NATO INTERNATIONAL STAFF ON THE PREPARATION OF THE DOCUMENTS UNDER DISCUSSION WHICH HE FELT CONSTITUTED A VERY USEFUL GUIDE. CONSULTATION WITH THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED NATIONS WAS IMPORTANT, BUT BELGRADE SHOULD NOT BECOME A TRIBUNAL. THE WEST SHOULD AVOID STIFFENING THE ATTITUDES OF OTHER COUNTRIES. HE NOTED THAT WHILE THE PREPARATORY MEETING HAD A FIXED AGENDA, THE MAIN MEETING WAS FACED WITH THE ASPECT OF INTANGIBILITY OF THE FINAL ACT. THE WEST, WHILE SEEKING TO IMPROVE THE FINAL ACT, SHOULD AVOID CHANGING IT. FERREIRA SAID THAT CAREFUL CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE MEDITERRANEAN NATIONS WITHOUT, HOWEVER, NECESSARILY EXPANDING THE CSCE. ON THE QUESTION OF DURATION OF THE BELGRADE MEETING, HE SAID ONLY THAT THE WEST SHOULD BE FLEXIBLE. HE CLOSED BY EXPRESSING HIS VIEW THAT IT WAS TOO EARLY TO SET A DATE FOR THE NEXT FOLLOW-UP CONFERENCE.

9. THE ICELANDIC FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THAT HIS VIEWS WERE IN ABSOLUTE CONFORMITY WITH THOSE OF HIS DANISH AND  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 LONDON 07815 03 OF 09 111828Z

NORWEGIAN COLLEAGUES. THEY HAD ONLY RECENTLY HELD A FIVE POWER MEETING IN HELSINKI AND DISCUSSED CSCE IN COMPLETE HARMONY. THE REPORT ON PREPARATIONS FOR BELGRADE POSES THE PROBLEM OF THESE PREPARATIONS IN PRECISE TERMS. MUCH CONSULTATION AMONG THE ALLIES WAS STILL NEEDED IN THE PERIOD OF THE BUILDUP TO AND DURING THE BELGRADE MEETING. THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE AT BELGRADE SHOULD BE TO REVIEW THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL PARTS OF THE FINAL ACT. THIS SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT IN A POSITIVE SPIRIT WITH AVOIDANCE OF RECRIMINATION AND GEARED TO

IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH EASTERN EUROPE. AS FOR DURATION, THE NECESSARY TIME SHOULD BE ALLOWED. PARTICIPANTS SHOULD AIM AT AN OPTIMUM DURATION OF THREE MONTHS. AGUSTSSON SAID SUCH A TARGET DATE SHOULD BE AUTOMATICALLY EXTENDED IF NECESSARY AND THE CLOSING DATE SHOULD BE EXTENDED BY CONSENSUS IF NEED BE RATHER THAN THE OTHER WAY AROUND.

10. THE CANADIAN FOREIGN MINISTER SAID HE HAD PREPARED A COMPREHENSIVE STATEMENT, WHICH HE WOULD TABLE, BUT WOULD KEEP HIS REMARKS BRIEF. THE FINAL ACT WAS A BALANCED DOCUMENT, BUT WAS NOT SEEN THAT WAY IN MANY OF THE ALLIED COUNTRIES, INCLUDING CANADA. JAMIESON AGREED THAT PUBLIC CONCERN WAS FOCUSED ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE. THE ALLIES MUST BE CAREFUL NOT TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THEIR PREOCCUPATION WITH CERTAIN POINTS CALLED INTO QUESTION THEIR COMMITMENT TO ALL PARTS. THEY SHOULD NOT WANT TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS WAS LACKING IN ALL COUNTRIES OF EASTERN EUROPE TO AN EQUAL DEGREE. THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN EASTERN EUROPE WAS NOT WHOLLY STATIC AND THE ALLIES SHOULD ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THERE HAD BEEN MOVEMENT. THEY SHOULD NOT GO INTO THE CONFERENCE IN A MOOD OF CONFRONTATION. WHILE THEY SHOULD EMPHASIZE THEIR RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, THEY SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT THE OBLIGATION TO ENFORCE THE PROVISIONS OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT FELL  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 LONDON 07815 03 OF 09 111828Z

TO EACH SIGNATORY COUNTRY. JAMIESON POINTED OUT THAT BELGRADE WOULD NOT BE AN EASY CONFERENCE AND THAT IT WOULD BE CLOSELY FOLLOWED BY WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION. REGARDING DURATION OF THE CONFERENCE, HE CALLED ATTENTION TO THE GENERAL MISUNDERSTANDING ABOUT THE JUNE MEETING. HE THOUGHT IT NECESSARY TO EXPLAIN THAT THAT MEETING WAS PREPARATORY, THEN TO DEVELOP IN THE COMING WEEKS A POSITION ON DURATION, ON WHO IS TO BE SPOKESMAN ON WHICH ISSUES, ETC. HE STRESSED THE NEED TO AVOID DISAPPOINTMENT EITHER BY RAISING EXPECTATIONS TOO HIGH OR BY FAILING TO EXPRESS GROWING PUBLIC OPINION. FINALLY, JAMIESON MENTIONED THE NEED TO AVOID CONFRONTATION AND COMMENTED THAT IT WOULD BE IDLE TO LOOK FOR MIRACLES.

11. THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER POINTED OUT THAT THERE HAS BEEN A COMPLETE CHANGE OF OPINION SINCE HELSINKI. THAT CONFERENCE AT FIRST HAD APPEARED TO BE A SOVIET SUCCESS AND THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT WAS DEPLORED IN WESTERN COUNTRIES. SINCE HELSINKI, THE SITUATION HAS REVERSEITSELF THANKS TO A BETTER APPRECIATION OF WHAT THE FINAL ACT WAS. THE EFFECT OF BASKET III HAS BEEN REALIZED. THIS HAS PUT THE SOVIET UNION ON THE DEFENSIVE

AND IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE SOVIETS WERE GOING TO BELGRADE

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 LONDON 07815 04 OF 09 111830Z  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 09 LONDON 07815

WITH APPREHENSION. DE GUIRINGAUD WARNED THAT THE ALLIES MUST SAFEGUARD AGAINST THE DANGER OF CENTERING EVERYTHING ON HUMAN RIGHTS. THEY MUST BEAR IN MIND THE VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE FINAL ACT AND RESTRICT THEMSELVES IN ADVANCE NOT TO MAKE NEGATIVE COMMENTS IN BELGRADE SO AS TO FRIGHTEN THE SOVIETS. AT THE SAME TIME, THE ALLIES MUST GO THERE WITH THE TOTAL FREEDOM TO OBSERVE THE RESULTS OF HELSINKI. DE GUIRINGAUD EMPHASIZED THAT THE ALLIES WANTED TO SEE ONE WINNER THERE--DETENTE. BUT THAT WOULD NOT PREVENT THE ALLIES EXPLAINING THEIR POSITIONS IN TOTAL FREEDOM.

12. DE GUIRINGAUD WENT ON MORE SPECIFICALLY. FIRST, HE SAID THAT ONE SHOULD NOT MULTIPLY FRESH PROPOSALS. IT WAS NOT A QUESTION OF A FRESH CONFERENCE ADDITIONAL TO THE HELSINKI CONFERENCE. IT WAS NECESSARY TO CONCENTRATE ON REALISTIC SUGGESTIONS FOR BETTER IMPLEMENTATION OF WHAT WAS ALREADY IN THE FINAL ACT. SECOND, DE GUIRINGAUD SAID IT WAS NECESSARY TO AVOID TRYING TO FIX A TARGET DATE. THE DISCUSSIONS MUST LAST AS LONG AS NECESSARY TO EXAMINE THE RESULTS OF THE HELSINKI ACT IN ALL OF ITS ASPECTS. IF A TARGET DATE WERE FIXED, THE WEST COULD BE SURE THAT THE SOVIETS AND EASTERN EUROPEANS WOULD DRAG THEIR FEET. THE TARGET DATE WOULD ARRIVE AND THE CONFER-

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 LONDON 07815 04 OF 09 111830Z

ENCE WOULD HAVE TO DISPERSE WITHOUT THE FULL DISCUSSIONS THE WEST WANTED. IT SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR THAT THE DISCUSSIONS WOULD LAST AS LONG AS NECESSARY AND END WHEN THAT POINT WAS REACHED. FINALLY, COMMENTING ON THE DOCUMENTS BEFORE THE COUNCIL, DE GUIRINGAUD SAID THAT THE FRENCH DELEGATION APPRECIATED ALL THE WORK THAT HAD BEEN DONE. THESE DOCUMENTS WERE USEFUL AS AN ADDITIONAL FACTOR TO THE CONSULTATIONS TAKING PLACE ELSEWHERE, BUT THEY DID NOT REPLACE THOSE CONSULTATIONS ON PREPARATIONS FOR BELGRADE. HE SAID THERE WAS A WIDE AREA OF AGREEMENT AND THE ALLIES SHOULD MUTUALLY INFORM EACH OTHER.

13. SECRETARY VANCE SAID HE SHARED JAMIESON'S VIEW THAT SINCE A HIGH DEGREE OF CONSENSUS HAD BEEN EXPRESSED, IT WAS NOT PRODUCTIVE TO REPEAT ALL THAT HAD ALREADY BEEN COVERED. HE COMMENTED THAT THE REPORT WAS VERY GOOD AND FORMED AN EXCELLENT BASIS FOR THE COUNCIL'S WORK. CONFINING HIMSELF TO SEVERAL SPECIFIC POINTS, THE SECRETARY SAID, FIRST, THAT HE AGREED VERY STRONGLY WITH THE DANISH FOREIGN MINISTER THAT IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO DEFINE HUMAN RIGHTS TOO NARROWLY. THE WEST WOULD THEREBY FALL INTO A TRAP THAT MUST BE AVOIDED. SECOND, THE SECRETARY AGREED THAT THE ALLIES MUSH APPROACH THE CONFERENCE IN A SPIRIT OF COOPERATION, NOT CONFRONTATION. BUT HE INTRODUCED A WORD OF CAUTION, SAYING THIS WOULD BE DIFFICULT BECAUSE PUBLIC OPINION IN THE NATO COUNTRIES WOULD BE FOLLOWING THE CONFERENCE CLOSELY. IT WAS NECESSARY TO DRAW THE LINE CAREFULLY, AND THIS WOULD CHALLENGE THE ALLIES' SKILLS AND THOUGHTFULNESS. THIRD, THE SECRETARY SAID IT WAS HIGHLY IMPORTANT TO CONSULT WITH NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES IN PREPARATION FOR BELGRADE. FOURTH, THE SECRETARY COMMENTED THAT HE FOUND A DEGREE OF CONFUSION CONCERNING THE TARGET DATE. HE SAID IT WAS THE US VIEW THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD SET FOR THEMSELVES A TARGET DATE WITHOUT PROPOSING A FIXED DATE FOR THE CONCLUSION OF THE CONFERENCE.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 LONDON 07815 04 OF 09 111830Z

14. LUNS COMMENTED THAT THE DANISH AND US VIEWS COULD BE RECONCILED. ONE COULD SET A TARGET DATE FOR JUST BEFORE CHRISTMAS, BUT NOT MAKE A FIXED PROPOSAL.

15. THE BELGIAN PRIME MINISTER MADE THREE POINTS. FIRST, VAN ELSLANDE SAID THAT THE ALLIES, DURING THEIR DISCUSSIONS THESE LAST FEW MONTHS, HAD FLEXIBILITY AND



CAREFULNESS IN MIND. THIS SAME APPROACH WAS TO BE FOUND IN THE REPORT, BUT HE PRAYED THAT THERE NOT BE TOO MUCH FLEXIBILITY AND TOO MUCH CAREFULNESS. HE CITED AS AN EXAMPLE THAT A LOT OF CARE HAD ALREADY BEEN SHOWN IN THE AREA OF HUMAN RIGHTS. HE COMMENTED THAT MR. VANCE HAD ALREADY SAID THAT WE MUST GIVE EXTENSIVE ATTENTION TO HUMAN RIGHTS. IF THE ALLIES WERE TO GIVE AN EXTENDED DEFINITION THAT GOES BEYOND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO HOLD DISCUSSIONS. IT WAS WORTHWHILE TO THINK OVER AGAIN THE EXACT MEANING OF PHRASES TO BE USED IN BELGRADE. IT WAS ALSO NECESSARY THROUGHOUT THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE FOR THE ALLIES TO MAINTAIN A UNITY OF CONCEPTION AND PRIORITIES AND TO KEEP UP THEIR USEFUL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE NEUTRAL COUNTRIES.

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 LONDON 07815 05 OF 09 111820Z  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 05 OF 09 LONDON 07815

16. FRG STATE SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS VAN WELL SAID THAT THE FRG HAD A SPECIAL INTEREST IN FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINAL ACT. HIS COUNTRY WAS PARTICIPATING ACTIVELY IN AN EXTENSIVE SYSTEM OF CONSULTATIONS GOING ON IN THE WEST, WITH THE EAST, AND WITH THE NEUTRALS. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO HOLD INTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS. FOR THE FRG THE FINAL ACT WAS SEEN AS A BACKDROP TO SPECIFIC PROBLEMS THE COUNTRY WAS FACING. IT HAD BILATERAL AGREEMENTS THAT WENT BEYOND THE FINAL ACT IN THE HUMANITARIAN FIELD. IN ADDITION, THE FINAL ACT COVERED NEW GROUND ON WHICH TO BUILD. AS EXAMPLES, HE

CITED ARRANGEMENTS PERTAINING TO THE GDR, BERLIN, POLAND, THE SOVIET UNION AND ROMANIA. THE FRG ALSO HAD A SPECIAL INTEREST IN BUILDING ON THE INFORMATION CHAPTER IN THE FINAL ACT. FOR EXAMPLE, ALMOST 10 MILLION EAST GERMANS WERE VIEWING WEST GERMAN TELEVISION; 8 MILLION WEST GERMANS VISITED EAST GERMANY LAST YEAR. ALL THESE THINGS WERE INTERRELATED: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CSCE AND THE GENERAL ATMOSPHERE OF DETENTE.

17. VAN WELL WARNED THAT THE FINAL ACT SHOULD NOT BE STRAINED. IT HAD MANY OPEN POSSIBILITIES WHICH COULD BE TRANSLATED INTO POLICY. THERE WAS NO NEED TO ADD TO CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 LONDON 07815 05 OF 09 111820Z

OR AMEND THE FINAL ACT. AS FOR THE POLITICAL CONCEPT PROPOSED BY THE SOVIET UNION, THE WEST GERMANS HAD ASKED, "WHERE IS THIS IN THE FINAL ACT?" THE FRG ALSO HAD A SPECIAL INTEREST IN FURTHER IMPLEMENTATION OF BASKET II. SOME SMALL PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE ON THE EXCHANGE OF STATISTICS AND A BREAKTHROUGH HAD BEEN MADE BY MOUNTING A FIRST JOINT BUSINESS VENTURE WITH ROMANIA. MOREOVER, THE FRG WAS NOW NEGOTIATING WITH SOME COMMUNIST COUNTRIES FOR AGREEMENTS ON PROTECTION OF INVESTMENTS. REGARDING A TERMINAL DATE FOR THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE, VAN WELL SAID THE FRG WAS IN FAVOR OF A TARGET DATE FOR ORIENTATION PURPOSES, BUT THAT A CLOSING DATE SHOULD BE SET BY CONSENSUS AND AIMED AT GETTING THE CONFERENCE BUSINESS DONE. HOWEVER, THE FRG WAS OPPOSED TO THE CONFERENCE DRAGGING ON TOO LONG. HE STRESSED THAT THE CONFERENCE SHOULD BE A WELL-STRUCTURED EVALUATION, WITH ALL THREE BASKETS INTERLOCKED AND FINISHED AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME.

18. LUNS CLOSED THE DISCUSSION OF CSCE BY STATING THAT A FULL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS HAD BEEN HELD AND HE TOOK IT THAT THE MINISTERS AGREED TO ENDORSING C-M(77)29 (FINAL), TAKING NOTE OF C-M(77)30 (FINAL).

19. LUNS INTRODUCED ITEM 3 ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND THE MEDITERRANEAN BY REFERRING TO THE FACT THAT SALT, MBFR, THE MEDITERRANEAN, AND OTHER RELATED QUESTIONS HAD BEEN DISCUSSED YESTERDAY RATHER FULLY. ON SALT HE MERELY WANTED TO STATE THAT THE ALLIES APPRECIATE THE THOROUGH AND COMPLETE CONSULTATIONS UNDERTAKEN WITHIN THE ALLIANCE BY THE US BOTH BEFORE AND AFTER SECRETARY VANCE'S MOSCOW TRIP. HE SAID THE ALLIES FOLLOW DEVELOPMENTS IN THIS FIELD WITH GREAT INTEREST AND THE CONTINUING PROCESS IS "UPPERMOST IN OUR MIND."

20. ON MBFR LUNS MERELY NOTED THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD CONTINUE "TO CHALLENGE THE OTHER SIDE" REGARDING

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 LONDON 07815 05 OF 09 111820Z

DATA AND PARTICULARLY THEIR DEFINITION OF "APPROXIMATE PARITY." HE NOTED THAT DESPITE INTENSIVE TALKS, IT HAS NOT BEEN POSSIBLE TO ESTABLISH HOW THE SOVIETS COME TO THEIR CONCLUSIONS, "WHICH ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE ESTABLISHED FACTS."

21. THE SECRETARY GENERAL CALLED ON SECRETARY VANCE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 LONDON 07815 06 OF 09 121321Z

ACTION EUR-12

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 06 OF 09 LONDON 07815

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT--PARA TWENTY-FIVE)

WHO SAID HE WOULD ADD JUST A WORD. NOTING THAT HE WOULD BE MEETING NEXT WEEK IN GENEVA WITH MR. GROMYKO TO DISCUSS FURTHER THE POSSIBILITY OF PROGRESS IN SALT. HE SAID HE WANTED THE MINISTERS TO KNOW THAT SHOULD THERE BE ANYTHING NEW IN THIS AREA PRIOR TO THE START OF THOSE GENEVA TALKS. HE WOULD ASK MR. WARNKE TO COME TO BRUSSELS TO BRIEF AND CONSULT WITH THE ALLIES. HE SAID HE DID NOT ANTICIPATE SUCH A DEVELOPMENT, BUT HE MERELY WANTED TO RECORD HIS WILLINGNESS TO UNDERTAKE SUCH A CONSULTATION IF DEVELOPMENTS MERITED IT. IN ANY EVENT, MR. WARNKE WILL COME TO DISCUSS THE GENEVA MEETING WITH THE COUNCIL JUST AS SOON AS IT IS CONCLUDED, MR. VANCE SAID. LUNS WELCOMED THIS ASSURANCE AND NOTED THAT MESSRS. WARNKE OR

VANCE, OR BOTH, WOULD BE WELCOME EITHER BEFORE OR AFTER THE GENEVA TALKS.

22. THE DANISH FOREIGN MINISTER ADDED "TWO WORDS" TO EXPRESS HIS OWN APPRECIATION FOR THE NEW AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION'S EFFORT AT CONSULTATIONS ON SALT ISSUES. HE SAID THAT WHAT "WE HOPE AND WANT" IS THE ASSURANCE THAT THESE CONSULTATIONS WILL CONTINUE ON A REGULAR BASIS SO AS TO "ENABLE ALL OF THE ALLIES TO MAKE MEANINGFUL CONTRIBUTIONS AND TO DEBATE THE ISSUES IN A CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 LONDON 07815 06 OF 09 121321Z

MEANINGFUL WAY."

23. THERE BEING NO FURTHER COMMENTS ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS, LUNS THEN NOTED THREE SPECIFIC REPORTS OF WHICH HE ASKED THE MINISTERS TO TAKE NOTE. THEY ARE 1) THE SITUATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, DOCUMENT C-M (77) 23 (FINAL); 2) RECENT ECONOMIC TRENDS IN SOVIET UNION, DOCUMENT C-M(77)31; AND 3) SOVIET MARITIME ACTIVITIES-SHIPPING-MERCHANT NAVY-FISHING FLEET, DOCUMENT C-M(77)32. THERE WERE NO COMMENTS OR ADDITIONS, AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL SIMPLY TOOK NOTE OF THE REPORTS ON BEHALF OF THE COUNCIL.

24. LUNS TURNED TO THE AGENDA ITEM ON STANDARDIZATION OF ARMAMENTS: INTEROPERABILITY OF EQUIPMENT BY NOTING THAT THERE IS A GROWING FEELING THAT ALLIANCE NATIONS MUST BECOME MORE EFFICIENT IN THE USE OF THEIR RESOURCES AND IN MEETING THEIR EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS. PRESIDENT CARTER HAD DEVOTED A LOT OF TIME TO THIS PROBLEM AND LUNS ENDORSED THE EMPHASIS BEING PLACED ON IT. THE ALLIANCE IS NOT GETTING THE RESULTS COMMENSURATE WITH THE RESOURCES IT COMMANDS TO MEET THE WARSAW PACT CHALLENGE. HE SAID THAT SPECIFIC PROGRAMS OF ACTION HAD BEEN BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF MINISTERS LAST DECEMBER AND HE URGED ALL TO EXAMINE THESE WITH THE AIM OF PREPARING A PLAN FOR IMPLEMENTATION. LUNS MADE AN APPEAL FOR THE ALLIANCE TO MOVE TOWARD HARMONIZATION AND TO SEEK COMMON EQUIPMENT.

25. WITH REGARD TO THE REPORT ON INTEROPERABILITY OF EQUIPMENT (REFERENCE PO/77/70), LUNS SAID THAT FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS SHOULD BE TAKEN IN THE COUNCIL AS THIS WOULD GIVE BROAD AND HIGH-LEVEL AGREEMENT. CONCERNING THE REPORT ON INTEROPERABILITY OF EQUIPMENT (DOCUMENT C-M (77) 26 (REVISED)), LUNS SAID THAT AD HOC COMMITTEE REPORT HAD DONE USEFUL WORK TO STIMULATE INTEROPERABILITY IN KEY AREAS. BUT THE TASK IS NOT FINISHED AND CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 LONDON 07815 06 OF 09 121321Z

LUNS RECOMMENDED THAT THE EXISTENCE OF THE COMMITTEE BE PROLONGED TO THE END OF THE YEAR. HE SUGGESTED THAT IN DECEMBER ITS FUTURE COULD BE TAKEN UP AGAIN AND A DECISION ABOUT ITS FUTURE MADE. LUNS NOTED ONE AREA OF PARTICULAR CONCERN: THE ISSUE OF TANK GUN AMMUNITION WHICH IS BOUND UP WITH THE DECISION ON THE MAIN BATTLE TANK AND THE GUN FOR THE MBT. HE URGED ALLIANCE NATIONS TO BE AWARE THAT THE ALLIANCE NEEDS TO STANDARDIZE ITS TANK GUNS AND MUST CONSIDER INTEROPERABILITY WHEN DECIDING ON IT MAIN BATTLE TANKS. MINISTERS AGREED TO EXTEND AD HOC COMMITTEE WORK ON INTEROPERABILITY TO THE END OF THE YEAR. LUNS DIRECTED ATTENTION OF MINISTERS TO PARAGRAPHS 7, 11, 16, 20, 25, 31 AND 35 -- ALL OF WHICH PROPOSED ACTIONS. HE SAID THAT IN AGREEING TO THE INTEROPERABILITY REPORT HE TOOK IT FOR GRANTED THAT THEY ACCEPTED THE RECOMMENDED ACTIONS.

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PAGE 01 LONDON 07815 07 OF 09 111909Z  
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 SSO-00 ONY-00 /028 W  
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3788

INFO AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 07 OF 09 LONDON 07815

26. MOVING TO THE REPORT ON INTEROPERABILITY AND SECURITY OF MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS IN NATO (DOCUMENT C-M (77) 27 (REVISED), LUNS NOTED THAT WHILE OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO DEFENSE MINISTERS, THIS ITEM HAD BEEN PUT ON THE AGENDA BECAUSE IT IS OF CONCERN TO ALL BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBLE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY. HE INVITED MINISTERS TO TAKE NOTE OF THE REPORT AND IT WAS SO DECIDED.

27. LUNS THEN TURNED TO THE REPORT BY THE CONFERENCE OF NATIONAL ARMAMENTS DIRECTORS (DOCUMENT C-M (77) 38 (REVISED). LUNS SAID THAT THIS IS THE OUTPUT OF THE CONFERENCE OF NATIONAL ARMAMENTS DIRECTORS (CNAD). HE NOTED THAT THIS COMMITTEE PLAYS AN IMPORTANT ROLE AND WILL DO SO PARTICULARLY IN THE COMING MONTHS. THE DOCUMENT RECOGNIZES THIS FACT. LUNS SAID THE CNAD SHOULD REPORT TO MINISTERS OF BOTH THE COUNCIL AND THE DPC. HE NOTED THE IMPORTANCE OF ESTABLISHING COMMON EQUIPMENT AND A COMPREHENSIVE SYSTEM OF ARMAMENTS PLANNING TO ENABLE ALLIANCE NATIONS TO MAKE THE FINANCIAL DECISIONS TO ALLOW NEW EQUIPMENT TO ENTER INTO SERVICE. THE REPORT SETS OUT THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH MUST BE OVERCOME. LUNS, NOTING IN PARTICULAR PARAGRAPH FOUR OF THE COVERING NOTE, ASKED FOR SUPPORT

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 LONDON 07815 07 OF 09 111909Z

OF THE WORK OF CNAD. AT THIS POINT DE GUIRINGAUD SAID THAT FRANCE WAS PREPARED TO NOTE THE REPORT AND IS QUITE GLAD THAT CNAD SHOULD SUBMIT PERIODIC REPORTS. HE WISHED TO MAKE A CLEAR DISTINCTION, HOWEVER, OBSERVING THAT NOTING A REPORT DOES NOT IMPLY ANY APPROVAL OF A CNAD DOCUMENT. HE SAID IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE THE REPORT HAD NOT BEEN STUDIED IN ALL NATO CAPITALS YET; HE URGED ON LUNS THE IMPORTANCE THAT EXTENSIVE TIMETABLES BE ARRANGED TO ENABLE REPORTS OF THE CNAD TO BE PROVIDED IN A TIMELY MANNER TO ALLOW STUDY. LUNS REPLIED HE AGREED WITH THIS ADMONITION, SAYING HE SHARED A SIMILAR CONCERN HIMSELF. THE SYSTEM WILL BE URGED TO SUBMIT REPORTS REGULARLY TO RELEVANT STAFFS AND COMMITTEES.

28. MOVING TO GUIDANCE FOR CIVIL EMERGENCY PLANNING, LUNS NOTED THAT THESE REPORTS (DOCUMENTS C-M (77)L7 (REVISED AND C-M(77) L8 (REVISED) ARE BEING MADE FOR THE FIRST TIME AT THE LEVEL OF AN AGENDA FOR MINISTERIAL CONSIDERATION. LUNS BEMOANED THE FACT THAT CIVIL EMERGENCY PLANNING (CEP) HAS BEEN A NEGLECTED AREA OF ACTION. HE SAID THAT THERE IS A GREAT IMBALANCE -- WHICH THE REPORT NOTES -- BETWEEN THE LEVELS OF MILITARY AND CIVIL PREPAREDNESS. THERE ARE LEGITIMATE REASONS FOR CONCERN WITH THE ISSUES OF CIVIL READINESS AND PLANNING PARTICULARLY SINCE THEY AFFECT HALF A BILLION PEOPLE IN THE ALLIANCE. ACTIVITY IN CIVIL DEFENSE IN THE SOVIET UNION IS GREAT AND LUNS CONSIDERED IT VITAL THAT CEP CONTRIBUTE TO ALLIANCE SECURITY. A SPECIAL EFFORT IS PARTICULARLY NEEDED IF WE ARE GOING TO MOVE TOWARD BETTER PREPARATION. IN THIS CONTEXT A NEW PLANNING AND REVIEW CYCLE HAS BEEN

INTRODUCED TO GIVE A MORE DISCIPLINEOAPPROACH TO THE  
PROBLEMS OF CEP. THIS APPROACH CALLS FOR PERIODIC  
GUIDANCE BY THE COUNCIL IN MINISTERIAL SESSIONS. THE  
DOCUMENT BEFORE THE COUNCIL IS THE FIRST ATTEMPT AT  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 LONDON 07815 07 OF 09 111909Z

GUIDANCE. LUNS ASKED THAT IT BE APPROVED. AT THIS  
POINT LUNS SAID HE WANTED TO MAKE A PERSONAL OBSERVA-  
TION THAT IT IS NOT SIMPLY ENOUGH TO APPROVE CEP.

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PAGE 01 LONDON 07815 08 OF 09 111928Z  
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 SSO-00 ONY-00 /028 W  
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3789

INFO AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 08 OF 09 LONDON 07815

HE SAID THAT HE MUST ASK FOR STRENUOUS EFFORTS TO  
TRANSLATE THE CEP GUIDANCE INTO EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION  
HE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THE US HAD ALREADY TAKEN  
SOME FORWARD STEPS.

29. SECRETARY VANCE MENTIONED RECENT DISCUSSIONS  
THAT HE HAD HAD WITH THE SOVIET UNION IN MOSCOW IN  
WHICH THE ISSUE OF CIVIL DEFENSE AND CIVIL EMERGENCY  
PLANNING HAD BEEN DISCUSSED IN THE CONTEXT OF BILATERAL  
EXCHANGE OF VIEWS CONCERNING THE STABILITY OF THE  
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR EQUATION. THE PROPOSITION THAT BOTH  
SIDES SHOULD LIMIT FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN THE  
CIVIL DEFENSE FIELD WAS CORRECT BECAUSE THEY  
COULD BE VIEWED AS A DESTABILIZING ELEMENT IN THE

STRATEGIC NUCLEAR EQUATION. SECRETARY VANCE NOTED THAT ABM'S AT ONE TIME WERE CONSIDERED NOT TO BE PART OF THE STRATEGIC EQUATION BECAUSE ABM'S ARE DEFENSIVE WEAPONS SYSTEMS. THIS WAS AND IS QUITE WRONG. POLITICALLY ABM'S AND THE CIVIL DEFENSE COULD BE A VERY DESTABILIZING ELEMENT. THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION WILL EXCHANGE PRELIMINARY PAPERS ON THESE SUBJECTS WHICH MAY WELL LEAD TO FURTHER DISCUSSION OF CIVIL DEFENSE. SECRETARY VANCE SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL REPORT DETAILS AFTER THE NEXT

CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 02 LONDON 07815 08 OF 09 111928Z

FEW WEEKS IF THE ISSUE DOES COME UP IN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. LUNS REITERATED HIS CONCERN THAT THE MATTER IS URGENT AND HIS HOPE THAT ACTION WILL BE TAKEN IN DUE COURSE.

30. LUNS CALLED UPON THE CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE TO GIVE HIS VIEWS SINCE IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE MILITARY VOICE SHOULD BE HEARD. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE SAID THAT CIVIL DEFENSE IS NEEDED IF THE ALLIANCE IS TO EXECUTE ALL ITS MILITARY TASKS. HE FELT THAT THE PAPER ON CEP IS A FORWARD STEP AND HOPES THAT ITS PROPOSALS WILL BE IMPLEMENTED. HE SAID THAT THE CIVIL SIDE CAN BE ASSURED THAT THE MILITARY SIDE WILL GIVE FULL COOPERATION TO THIS END. LUNS CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT HE HOPED ALL WOULD HEED WHAT HAS BEEN SAID.

31. DE GUIRINGAUD INTERVENED TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE CEP REPORT GOES BEYOND CIVIL EMERGENCY PLANNING SINCE IT TOUCHES ON THE ISSUE OF RE-ENFORCEMENT CAPABILITY (IN THAT IT RECOMMENDS ENHANCEMENT OF THE ALLIANCE'S TRANSPORT CAPABILITY ACROSS THE ATLANTIC FOR CIVIL EMERGENCY CONTINGENCIES). THIS ASPECT HAS ALREADY BEEN COVERED BY THE REMARKS OF THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF FRANCE. FRANCE WISHED TO EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE IT ATTACHES TO FREEDOM CONCERNING HOW TO DEFINE THE NATURE OF A CRISIS. FRANCE CONSIDERS THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL AS THE ONLY BODY WHICH CAN APPROPRIATELY NOTE A CRISIS SITUATION. THEREFORE, THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT COULD NOT ACCEPT ANY PLANS WHICH SIMPLY AND AUTOMATICALLY CHARACTERIZED WHAT MIGHT BE A CRISIS AND HENCE IT RESERVED UNTO ITSELF A RIGHT TO DEFINE WHAT CONSTITUTES A CRISIS SITUATION. IN SHORT, FRANCE DOES NOT WISH TO HAVE ITS FREEDOM OF DECISION-MAKING IMPAIRED BY ELEMENTS IN THE CEP REPORT. LUNS NOTED THE FRENCH RESERVATION.

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PAGE 03 LONDON 07815 08 OF 09 111928Z

32. SECRETARY LUNS NEXT NOTED THAT IN ACCORDANCE  
WITH HIS PO-134, HE WOULD SUGGEST THAT THE NEXT

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 LONDON 07815 09 OF 09 111917Z

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 SSO-00 ONY-00 /028 W

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O 111747Z MAY 77

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3790

INFO AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 09 OF 09 LONDON 07815

MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE COUNCIL TAKE PLACE IN  
BRUSSELS ON 8-9 DECEMBER 1977. HE ASKED THE MINISTERS  
TO PONDER THIS SUGGESTION, BEARING IN MIND THAT THEY  
HAD AGREED TO THIS SCHEDULE IN 1975. THERE WAS NO  
DISAGREEMENT, AND IT WAS LEFT AS "DECIDED." LUNS  
ALSO NOTED IN PASSING THAT THE MEETING FOLLOWING THE  
DECEMBER MINISTERIAL, I.E., NEXT SPRING, WOULD BE  
IN WASHINGTON AT THE SUMMIT WITH "MORE OR LESS" THE  
ATTENDANCE OF YESTERDAY.

33. OTHERWISE SMOOTH PARAGRAPH-BY-PARAGRAPH REVIEW  
OF FINAL COMMUNIQUE WAS INTERRUPTED BY AMENDMENT FROM  
FOREIGN SECRETARY OWEN OF PROPOSED LANGUAGE LAST  
SENTENCE OF PARA 3. OWEN'S SENSITIVITY TO PROPOSED  
LANGUAGE " . . . AND TO ASSUME TO THE BEST OF THEIR  
CAPABILITIES THE BURDENS THESE ENTAIL" RESTED ON THE  
SUGGESTION IMPLICIT (TO HIM) THAT THIS WOULD MEAN  
"INCREASED" DEFENSE, HENCE "ECONOMIC BURDENS."

34. EXCHANGE INVOLVED MUCH TO-ING AND FRO-ING WITH

LUNS RESISTING ON GROUNDS THAT BY ELIMINATING NOTION OF "BURDEN," COMMITMENT TO DEFENSE EXPENDITURE "IS DISAPPEARING AT TOP SPEED." LUNS' RESISTANCE COLLAPSED, HOWEVER, WHEN HE FOUND NO SUPPORT AROUND THE TABLE. CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 LONDON 07815 09 OF 09 111917Z

LUNS HAD FINAL WORD WITH WARNING THAT FOREIGN MINISTERS WERE WEAKENING COMMITMENTS ALREADY MADE BY DEFENSE MINISTERS.

35. LATER DEBATE, ON WHAT BECAME NEW PARA 12 INVOLVED DETERMINATION BY CANADIAN JAMIESON TO GET COMMUNIQUE TO SUPPORT IDEA OF AID TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, TURKISH SENSITIVITY AT BEING INCLUDED AS A "DEVELOPED" RATHER THAN (AS TURKS PREFER) "DEVELOPING COUNTRY," BRITISH DETERMINATION TO "POINT FINGER" AT POOR SOVIET BLOC EFFORT IN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, AND FRENCH BELIEF THAT NATO WAS INAPPROPRIATE FORUM FOR ALL OF THE ABOVE. SOLUTION WAS FOUND IN DELETING PROPOSED REFERENCE TO "DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE" AND TO "DEVELOPED/DEVELOPING" DISTINCTION, AND ADOPTION OF LAST 14 WORDS OF PARA 12 (SEE COMMUNIQUE).

36. WITH VISIBLE SIGN OF RELIEF LUNS CLOSED THE SESSION.

37. HAIL AND FAREWELL.

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